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ABSTRACT
Standing Ground: Situational Crisis Communication Theory
and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
Handbook Policy Change
Natalie Marie Tripp
School of Communications, BYU
Master of Arts
Situational crisis communication theory (SCCT), experimentally created by W. Timothy
Coombs in 2007, is designed to help crisis managers evaluate a crisis situation and craft an
effective response strategy based on the organization’s crisis history, the crisis type, and prior
reputation with stakeholders.
This thesis examined the November 2015 controversial handbook policy update from The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, which ruled same-sex marriage as grounds for
excommunication. Exploring the policy change as a crisis in the context of SCCT and comparing
the Church’s crisis response strategies with the recommended strategies of SCCT exposes a gap
in current SCCT literature—the theory does not lend itself well to crises where an organization’s
values or guiding morals are under attack. In these scenarios, the organization is unlikely to
apologize for or acknowledge the crisis.
The study results demonstrate substantial shifts in stakeholder attitudes following certain
strategic statements from the Church even though the Church did not strictly adhere to SCCT’s
guidelines. According to SCCT’s guidelines, because the stakeholder groups framed the
handbook change as a crisis of organizational misdeed with injuries the majority of the time, the
Church should have responded with third-tier strategies that bolstered its reputation and
apologized or compensated those harmed by the policy. Instead, the Church has never
apologized for the policy change and specifically reminded stakeholders of its past policies
regarding same-sex marriage.
Although the Church used the same strategies throughout the entire crisis, the Church’s
relatively larger use of crisis basics, justification, and protection in its second wave of statements
on November 13, 2015 shifted the crisis framing and sentiment of bloggers and John Dehlin
from negative sentiment with frames of high-level crisis responsibility to neutral and positive
sentiment with a majority of blogs and social media posts not framing the policy change as a
crisis.

Keywords: crisis communication, situational crisis communication theory, The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The turn of the 21st century gave rise to a new form of news gathering and sharing-social media networks. In its first decade, social media has grown to supplement, and, among
some demographics, even replace traditional media (Bradtzaeg et al., 2015). Reporters have
evolved from printing and broadcasting news once or twice a day to posting or tweeting
information on social networks in a never ending 24-hour news cycle. Not only are journalists
publishing their stories on social media, but reporters are also consciously changing the mold of
their content to be more shareable, with 75% of journalists claiming they feel more pressure now
to consider their story’s potential shareability on social platforms (Rubel, 2015).
Social media, specifically Twitter and Facebook, does have its merits as an additional
news platform for disseminating information and it’s easy to see why journalists are more fully
adopting it. First, there is already an audience of news consumers using social media, with some
specifically looking for news. At the start of 2016, Twitter had more than 300 million regular
users with 40% using the service to curate news that was especially important to the individual
user (Mihailidis, 2016). Secondly, the combination of social media and smartphone technology
make for a strong news gathering tool. Now more than ever witnesses to news events are able to
post their unmediated testimonies as events unfold, in real time and those reports remain
permanently accessible to anyone, anywhere with uncontrolled Internet access. Reporters can
draw from a deep well of sources on social media instantaneously as news breaks and re-share
that information within seconds.
While the increased speed and distance a message can travel via social media can be
considered a boon to the journalism industry, often lost in the hastening pace is necessary fact
checking and verification of sources before tweets, posts, and digital articles are published.
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During a breaking news event, misinformation (intentional or otherwise) can spread rapidly
through social media. During the coverage of the Sandy Hook massacres in 2012, national news
outlets made numerous mistakes, including reports naming Adam Lanza’s brother, Ryan, as the
shooter (Diaz, 2012). The New York Post, CNN, and other news outlets were also criticized for
their inaccurate reports following the bombings in Boston during the 2013 marathon (Foust,
2013). With more than two billion people using social media (Kemp, 2015), there is an
overwhelming amount of content to dig through during a crisis. The spread of misinformation by
news media may be due to a lack of time needed to sift through and verify rumors while under
mounting pressure to be the first entity to break or update the story.
Even outside of spot news, both professional and citizen journalists using social media
can make information, or misinformation, quickly go viral. Occasionally, social media users are
the creators of a crisis, crying foul against an individual or organization and spreading their
disapproval through the social networks. As a result, corporations have begun using social media
as a tool for reputation repair and for the prevention of boycotting (Schutz, Utz, & Goritz, 2011).
Stakeholders are used to being in control of content in the social media realm, so crisis
communicators have to be discerning in their social media strategies by listening and providing
access to information while using crisis management steps (Coombs, 2012a). This can be
particularly challenging for crisis communicators as the era of social media and new
technological developments have made expectations “extremely high as to how organizations
respond to a crisis and communicate through the course of a crisis” (Malone & Coombs, 2009,
p.121).
No stranger to criticism, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints once again fell
under scrutiny after making some changes to the official Church handbook used by lay
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leadership throughout the organization (The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2015).
In November 2015, the Church updated the handbook’s section on disciplinary councils and the
criteria for listing a Church member as an apostate, specifically dealing with homosexual
relationships. The revisions included three definitive changes (The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, 2015):
1) Optional disciplinary councils for individuals engaging in homosexual behavior,
particularly involving sexual cohabitation.
2) The definition of apostasy would now include same-gender marriage, requiring a
mandatory disciplinary council.
3) A child living with parents in a same-sex relationship may not receive a name and a
blessing in the Church, be baptized, confirmed, ordained or recommended to missionary
service until the child is of legal age, no longer living with the parents involved, has
interviewed with a stake or mission president of the Church, and receives permission
from the Church’s highest ranking leadership, the First Presidency. (Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2015)
On November 3, 2015, the Church released these changes in a letter solely intended for
lay leadership who would be involved in governing the new changes. A few days after the letter
was signed and released, it was “leaked” to the public via social media and quickly became a
trending topic, attracting national media attention within hours. Although the handbook revisions
may not have originally been perceived by the Church as causing a potential crisis, the viral
spread through traditional and social media quickly resulted in a division among members of the
Church and inflammatory articles accusing the Church of exclusion and bigotry.
This study analyzes The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints crisis
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communication strategies during the firestorm following the handbook revisions, based on
Coombs’ situational crisis communication theory (SCCT). Specifically, this study focuses on
how the news media framed the news of the handbook revisions as the changes first became
public knowledge, how the Church responded to the resulting crisis, and whether or not the news
media’s framing changed following the Church’s response. As such, this study additionally relies
on underpinnings of image restoration theory, attribution theory, and framing theory.
Methodologically, this thesis will employ a content analysis using news articles, blog posts, and
social media published over the course of the crisis categorized by their corresponding SCCT
components. This data will be used to gauge the effectiveness and appropriateness of the
Church’s crisis communication.
Background of the Crisis:
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is an American Christian church founded
in 1830 by Joseph Smith with more than 15 million members worldwide (Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints [LDS Church], 2015). The Church professes to be a restored version of the
Christian church that existed at the time of Jesus Christ (Smith, 1842). It relies on doctrines
found in the King James Version of the Bible and an additional ancient text translated by Smith
called The Book of Mormon: Another Testament of Jesus Christ. Historically, the Church has
maintained a conservative view on marriage and homosexuality. Referring to its scriptural
doctrines, the Church specifically states:
Sexual activity should only occur between a man and a woman who are married.
However, that should never be used as justification for unkindness. Jesus Christ, whom
we follow, was clear in His condemnation of sexual immorality, but never cruel. His
interest was always to lift the individual, never to tear down. (LDS Church, 2012)
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The Church does not recognize homosexual marriage and homosexual behavior may warrant
disciplinary action. However, the Church does distinguish between same-sex attraction and
behavior, acknowledging feeling of attractions as not inherently sinful.
John Dehlin is a popular blogger, personal counselor, and former member of The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. In 2011, Dehlin stated that he had stopped attending Church
services because he could no longer believe some of the Church’s claims (Post Mormon, 2013).
After years of challenging Church doctrine and encouraging others to do the same, Dehlin was
excommunicated from the Church by his local Church leadership, claiming Dehlin’s online
statements rejecting particular Church teachings constituted apostasy (Walch, 2015). Despite
severing ties, Dehlin continues to monitor and criticize Church policies and activity on social
channels like Facebook, Twitter, and his own podcast called Mormon Stories (Dehlin, 2016).
On November 5, 2015—just two days after the Church sent a letter to lay leadership
informing them of changes to the handbook policy—Dehlin obtained a copy of the letter and
posted it to social media citing the changes as “a very sad day for Mormonism” (Dehlin, 2015).
In the next 30 hours, Dehlin would post 20 more times on Facebook about the policy change, and
reach out to media outlets across the country to cover the issue. As word of the changes spread, it
became a trending topic on Facebook, and national media outlets began to take notice. Major
media players like The New York Times and Washington Post covered the story within the first
24 hours. On social media, news of the handbook changes caused a division both among
members of the Church and even by those unaffiliated with the Church and unaffected by the
policy change. In early news reports, the Church would confirm the documents Dehlin shared on
social media were accurate (Dobner, 2015) but did not make an official statement clarifying the
reasons for the changes until the next day on November 6 around 9 p.m.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to better understand how an organization may respond to a
crisis while also choosing to stand by its policies despite the winds of public opinion. An
organization may not always choose to acknowledge a crisis, or see a need to apologize for a
crisis. Though relatively brief in duration, the crisis resulting from the Church’s handbook
revisions illustrates this concept.
The Church assumes dual roles as both a religion and organization. Because The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is a religion which believes in inspired revelation from God,
guided by leaders who establish divine doctrine, the changes to the handbook are based on
gospel doctrine and therefore considered to come from God himself. As a religion, the Church
cannot recognize the changes as an error or crisis without tacitly inviting speculation that other
policies or institutional decisions have also been in error, thereby calling into question its claims
of divine foundation and purpose. The Church has not offered an apology or taken corrective
action concerning the handbook changes. But as an organization, the Church does recognize
there are stakeholders who have been emotionally compromised by the changes. Also, because
all of the Church’s crisis response statements were presented through the digital world of the
Internet, this thesis will greatly contribute to the examination of SCCT in the context of
organizational use of social media. Austin, Liu, and Jin (2012) state that recent crisis
communication cases highlight the need for a better understanding of effective use of social
media during these situations and that currently research on this subject is emerging.
Additionally, the crisis spread quickly on social media, particularly after being leaked by
influential blogger John Dehlin. Agarwal, Liu, Tang, and Yu (2008) presented five properties
that make up an influential blogger— recognition, activity, generation, novelty, and eloquence.
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Dehlin’s social media accounts are examples of his influence in terms of recognition and
activity. On Facebook and Twitter combined, Dehlin has more than 15,000 subscribers, and he
posts on those social media accounts several times daily (i.e.,
https://www.facebook.com/johndehlin, https://twitter.com/johndehlin, and
https://www.facebook.com/johndehlinpublic). His success in leaking the changes to the public
and news media and his ability to hold attention on the issue until the Church responded is
evidence of his influence in terms of generation. This is important to note, because influencers
like Dehlin can be considered stakeholders during a crisis even though Dehlin is not affected by
the handbook changes as an ex-member of the Church.
On the other hand, the Church has its own group of influencers in the form of highranking leadership (apostles) and active Church members who are popular bloggers, celebrities,
and social media users who are esteemed in their respective communities. However, the
Church’s prior history with doctrinal revisions (Turner, 2012) and other reportedly exclusive
restrictions against homosexual behavior made the crisis an easy target for the media (Healy,
2015).
Because it has so many different attributes, this study of the handbook policy change and
resulting crisis will contribute to the cultivation of important research areas where crisis response
warrants further exploration, such as its use in social media as stated above. The study will also
shed light on the effects of crisis communication when the organization in crisis does not or
cannot fully recognize the event as a crisis. The case study of the Church handbook revisions and
resulting crisis is not only applicable to other religious institutions but also to any organization,
politician, or individual who chooses to stand behind policies, procedures, and/or beliefs when it
may seem unpopular to do so in the court of public opinion.

8
Chapter 2: Literature Review
In order to understand situational crisis communication theory, one must first define
organizational crisis and explore the various methods of crisis management used to respond to
crises. Following the definition, SCCT’s theoretical roots must be examined to allow for a better
understanding of the specific strategies SCCT employs and the history of the theory. Lastly, the
SCCT framework and its evolution throughout the last couple of decades needs to be defined.
Organizational Crisis
There are many varying definitions of what constitutes an organizational crisis, though
most share conceptual similarities. Coombs (1999) defines it as “an event that is an
unpredictable, major threat that can have negative effect on the organization, industry, or
stakeholders if handled improperly” (p.2). Fearns-Banks (1996) similarly describes an
organizational crisis as “a major occurrence with a potentially negative outcome affecting an
organization, company, or industry, as well as publics, products, services of good name. It
interrupts normal business transactions and can sometimes threaten the existence of an
organization” (p.1).
Many authors have additionally observed that a single crisis can completely alter an
organization. Friedman (2002) concludes that it could be a “radical change” in a positive or
negative direction (p. 5); Fink (1986) agrees, citing a crisis is a “turning point for better or
worse” (p. 15). Martinelli and Briggs (1988) suggest “a crisis can be seen as an opportunity to
demonstrate an organization’s commitment to responsible behaviors” (p. 44).
Crisis management. True to its name, crisis management attempts to minimize damage
while protecting as much of the organization’s reputation as possible. According to Coombs
(2012a), crisis management was initially used in emergency scenarios, with four interrelated
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factors of crisis management drawn from those situations: prevention, preparation, response, and
revision. Prevention is the crisis avoidance steps that the organization makes and also the act of
heeding warning signs to avoid the crisis completely. Preparation is the most well-known step,
as it includes examining crisis vulnerabilities, assembling a crisis management team and
spokespersons, making a crisis portfolio, and launching a crisis communication system.
Response is setting those elements into action, which often becomes a very public spectacle
garnering media attention. Revision involves evaluating the response to make future crisis
management more effective.
To define his initial three macrostages of the crisis management process, Coombs
(2012a) built upon these principles and past crisis management frameworks, such as Fink’s
(1986) four-stage model, Mitroff’s (1994) five-stage model, and the three-stage model
recommended by numerous crisis management authors (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003; Guth,
1995; Richardson, 1994; Birch, 1994; Mitchell, 1986). Fink’s model relates phases of a crisis to
a disease, and categorizes them into four stages: the prodromal stage, the acute stage, the
chronic stage, and the resolution stage. The prodromal stage is the warning stage, and the point
where crisis managers attempt to identify a looming crisis. The acute stage occurs when the
crisis actually happens, and its damage is usually a result of how well the crisis was managed in
the prodromal stage. The chronic stage is the recovery phase where the lasting effects of the
crisis are more fully seen. The resolution stage is the final phase or the clearly defined end of the
crisis.
Mitroff’s (1994) five-stage model is composed of five stages: signal detection, probing
and prevention, damage containment, recovery, and learning. Signal detection and probing and
prevention are the counterparts to Fink’s prodromal stage, occurring when a company or
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organization recognizes the warning signs of a crisis. Additionally, damage containment aligns
with Fink’s acute stage, with recovery matching the chronic and resolution stages. The additional
stage of Mitroff’s model that adds to Fink’s four-stage model is the final learning stage where
crisis managers evaluate the events of the crisis for future prevention of negative events.
Not attributed to any particular scholar, the three-stage model was formed organically by
many crisis management authors: “The three-stage model is not associated with any particular
theorists, but it appears to have emerged from several research efforts as general analytical
framework” (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p.97). Richardson (1994) provided the first
defined set of the three-stage model components: precrisis or predisaster phase, crisis impact or
rescue phase, and recovery or demise phase. Similarly, Coombs (2012a) defines three
macrostages of the crisis management process: precrisis, crisis, and postcrisis. Each of the
macrostages also includes substages. Coombs states that he selected this framework “because of
its ability to subsume the other stages’ approaches used in crisis management” (p.10) and
because his stages are broad enough to encompass previous crisis management models while still
allowing “for the integration of ideas from other crisis management experts” (p.11).
The precrisis phase has three substages: signal detection, prevention, and crisis
preparation (Coombs, 2012a). Once again, signal detection identifies the signs that a potential
crisis is on the horizon. Crisis prevention involves managing the signals to prevent the crisis,
lowering levels of risk or eliminating the risk altogether, and managing reputation by resolving
any relationship problems between the organization and stakeholders. Crisis preparation
includes finding vulnerabilities within the organization, creating a crisis management plan,
creating a crisis management team, and building firm crisis communication systems.
The crisis phase is marked by a triggering event, signaling the start of a crisis.

11
Communication with stakeholders is the primary priority in this stage. This phase has two
substages: crisis recognition and crisis containment. Crisis recognition is the ability of crisis
managers to identify and label a situation as a crisis and furthermore convince the corporation’s
managers that there is a crisis. Crisis containment is the initial response to stakeholders and all
follow-up communication as well as any other strategies that bring the crisis to a swift end
incorporating the least amount of damage (Coombs, 2012a).
The postcrisis phase happens when the crisis has officially passed and is a time when
crisis managers reflect on their response. The phase allows managers to learn from mistakes
and/or victories, improving their plans for future crises. A necessary part of postcrisis is followup communication with stakeholders to ensure their satisfaction with the organization’s crisis
response strategies (Coombs, 2012a).
Coombs' three-stage crisis model (2012a) will be used for analysis in this thesis. Because
this study argues that the Church never acknowledged the handbook revisions as a crisis to begin
with, there wasn’t a precrisis phase in this situation. Consequently, John Dehlin triggered the
crisis recognition subphase when he posted about the revisions on his Facebook pages. The
Church’s official response to the media attention marks an attempt at a crisis containment
subphase, and the second official letter from the Church with an accompanying blog post by
spokesperson Michael Otterson is evidence of a postcrisis phase.
Crisis communication. An important part of crisis management, crisis communication is
“defined broadly as the collection, processing, and dissemination of information required to
address a crisis situation” (Coombs, 2012b, p.20). Fearns-Banks (1996) noted that this crucial
communication occurs between the organization and its public before, during, and after a crisis,
and is designed to “minimize damage to the image of the organization” (p.2). The ultimate
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outcome is for crisis communication to be handled quickly and accurately, mitigating any
possible damage.
Stakeholder perceptions and reactions are the real test of whether or not a situation is a
crisis (Coombs, 2012b). Therefore, in order for an organization to arrive at the positive end of
the spectrum following a crisis, efficient crisis communication with the stakeholders is pivotal.
Regardless of how the organization views the event, crisis communication from the organization
needs to be created from the perspective of the media and the publics involved (Gillingham &
Noizet, 2007). If handled poorly, stakeholders can cause widespread damage to the company,
from small annoyances to the complete extinction of the organization (Feduik, Coombs &
Boltero, 2012).
Crisis Communication and Social Media
Years before social media’s rise in dominance, Greer and Moreland (2003) observed the
Internet’s ability to offer companies new avenues to respond to crises, both internally and
externally. United and American airlines both used their respective websites to convey
information and offer condolences in the three weeks following the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 (Greer & Moreland, 2003). However, despite the airlines’ success in communicating
during that crisis period, Perry, Taylor, and Doerfel (2003) found that the majority of
organizations still relied on traditional media tactics and one-way communication strategies
during a crisis. Though in just a couple of years an updated study by Perry and Taylor (2005)
showed that more than half (54%) of organizations were using the Internet as part of their crisis
response strategies. Nearly a decade later, Coombs (2012a) explained that many organizations
still don’t acknowledge a crisis on their websites, but the use of social media for crisis
communication is growing rapidly and is now “responsible for the growing link between crisis
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communication/management and the online world” (p. 21).
After the initial social networking sites MySpace and Facebook were launched in 2003
and 2004 respectively, the term social media was born (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010, p. 61). Those
two trailblazing companies, along with Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube, are the
giants of social media in terms of most used platforms (Pew, 2015), but social media is a broad
term that covers many different communication tools (Coombs, 2012a). The list is always
morphing and expanding, but Coombs offered the following categories to assist crisis managers
in their understanding of the social media realm (see Table 1).
Currently, people are relying more on social media to acquire information, rather than
traditional forms of media (Cho & Park, 2013). But no matter where the crisis actually takes
places, social media can immediately make a crisis go viral with shares and reshares “reaching
millions of people without the interviewing presence of journalists” (Veil, Beuhner, & Palenchar,
2011, p.111). This heightens the urgency for an organization to communicate reliable
information to the stakeholders as quickly as possible, using social media as an advantage while
also minimizing the disadvantages (Freberg, 2012).

Table 1
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Social Media Categories
Category

Definition

Social Networks

Individual Web pages from which people share content and
communicate with friends (e.g., Facebook, MySpace, Bebo)

Blogs

Online journals where people post content and others can comment
on it (e.g., Blogspot, Wordpress)

Wikis

Web pages where people work together to create and edit content
(e.g.,Wikipedia)

Podcast

Audio and video content created and distributed through a
subscription based service (e.g., The Executive Lounge With Andrew
Coffrey

Forums

Online discussions revolving around specific interests and topics
(e.g., Reddit)

Content communities

Places where people organize themselves around specific content
that they create and comment on (e.g., YouTube, Flickr, Instagram)

Microblogs

Online communities on which people share small amounts of
information through posts (e.g., Twitter)

Aggregators

Tools that collect content (e.g. news stories, blog posts) from
different sites in one site; content is frequently ranked by popularity
and can include comments from users (e.g., Google Reader)

Social bookmarking

Tool with which people share and rate content they have found
online (e.g., Delicious, Pinterest)

Note. Adapted from Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing, and responding, p. 24
by W.T. Coombs, 2012, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Organizational crises can be delineated to include both traditional crises and also crises
on social media. Owyang (2011) defines a social media crisis as “a crisis issue that arises in or is
amplified by social media, and results in negative mainstream media coverage, a change in
business process, or financial loss” (p. 9). Social media crises are separated into three categories:
dissatisfied customers, organizational misuses, and challenges. Dissatisfied customers are
defined as unhappy customers who voice their concerns with a company. This is mainly a
customer service problem. Organizational misuse is described as a company misusing a social
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media channel by posting something inappropriate or unethical (Coombs, 2015). Challenges
occur when stakeholders believe an organization is acting inappropriately and consequently
challenges have their own set of categories: organic, expose, and villain (Coombs, 2010).
Organic challenges occur when a company simply loses touch with what stakeholders expect.
Expose challenges happen when stakeholders flag an organization for acting hypocritically.
Villain challenges transpire when a specific group of stakeholders are arguing with an
organization and these stakeholders frame the organization as a nefarious monster “that needs to
reform its evil ways” (Coombs, 2015, p.25).
Crisis managers need to understand how social media factors into the three macrostages
of the crisis management process in order to determine the best course of action. In the precrisis
stage, crisis managers need to be vigilant for warning signs from stakeholders. This can be done
by scanning websites and social media. However, crises that begin on social media happen in full
view of the stakeholders, though still invisible to traditional media. This “blurs the line between
precrisis and crisis response because addressing the paracrisis can appear to be a crisis response
rather than preventative action” (Coombs, 2012a, p.26).
Coombs (2012a) suggested three rules for using online communications during crisis
response: (a) be present, (b) be where the action is, (c) be there before the crisis. Being present
restricts crisis managers from shying away from the crisis on social media. They must
acknowledge the problem. “If the crisis is never mentioned in the organization’s communication,
the absence will be noticeable” (p. 27). Being where the action is requires that crisis managers
use the social media platform the crisis originated on to respond to the online crisis. Being there
before the crisis demands an organization already have a social media presence before the crisis
began. According to Coombs, the most effective crisis response happens when the organization
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already has followers who regularly view content (p. 28).
Stakeholders may still require information when a crisis is over in the postcrisis phase
and may look to the organization’s social media sites for answers (Lambert, 2015).
Organizations can accomplish this kind of information sharing on Facebook, Twitter, corporate
blogs, websites, or anywhere that stakeholders digitally congregate during the crisis. Coombs
(2012a) suggests that any special websites dedicated to the crisis be decommissioned when
interest begins to wane (p. 28). Specific to this study, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints’ website Mormon Newsroom is designed for providing new information and clarification
on church issues to both those within the faith and those outside.
Coombs’ (2007) situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) “provides an
evidenced-based framework for understanding how to maximize the reputational protection
afforded by post-crisis communication” (p.63). SCCT suggests guidelines which crisis managers
can employ for reputational protection during an organizational crisis. To understand the
elements of SCCT for the application used in this thesis, it is essential to understand the
theoretical roots of crisis communication and SCCT: framing theory, imager repair theory, and
attribution theory. These theories provide insight into the building blocks of SCCT, allowing a
clearer picture of how SCCT functions when used for crisis response.
Framing Theory. Framing theory is important in crisis communication because in order
to form an appropriate response, crisis managers either need to understand how they can frame
the crisis as it develops or they must understand how stakeholders and media may have framed
the crisis in order to form an appropriate response.
Gamson and Modigliani (1987) described the framing of a news story as a package
composed of arguments, information, symbols, metaphors, and images with “a central organizing

17
idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (p. 143). Additionally,
the information in that package may influence the consumers’ beliefs about the issue at hand and
how it is handled. At their most powerful, frames persuade people to think about an issue in a
particular context, as Simon and Jerit (2007) demonstrated by using either fetus or baby in news
articles about abortion. The results of Simon and Jerit’s work illustrated the effect of a single
word to alter audience perceptions and attitudes. In turn, how people think about issues shapes
how they feel issues should be resolved (Druckman, 2001; Entman, 1993; Nelson & Oxley,
1999). Stakeholders depend on news media for information about organizations, including crisisrelated information, but one of the limitations to framing is credibility. Only credible news
sources have been shown to elicit the framing effect (Druckman, 2001).
Framing involves selecting some aspects of a situation or issue and making those aspects
salient so that particular definitions of the situation emerge (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). A news
story may emphasize one frame over another by only presenting information that supports the
favored frame. Coombs and Holladay’s (2010) crisis framing effect “occurs when the emphasis
on a subset of potentially relevant cues causes stakeholders to focus on these cues when
constructing their perceptions” (p. 192). In crisis communication, framing changes the
importance of different cues, and as a result, alters the belief of importance related to the cause
of the crisis (e.g., Was the Church handbook policy change a matter of incompetence or an
intentional, harmful act?). Additionally, Coombs and Holladay asserted that accident crises are
particularly subject to crisis framing when considered in terms of an organization’s prior
reputation: “A favorable prior reputation protects the organization’s reputation from the
increased threat of a human error crisis. An unfavorable prior reputation automatically makes a
technical error crisis appear like a human error crisis—the reputation threat is intensified” (p.
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201).
While the “social media categories” (Coombs, 2012a) outlined in Table 1 seem diverse,
they do share a common characteristic: they are all user-generated content where “stakeholders
are accustomed to being in control” (Coombs, 2012a, p. 24). The two-way communication of
social media is drastically different from the one-way method of traditional media, which in turn
makes a unique and dramatic difference in crisis communication over social media. In traditional
media, crisis managers attempt to frame a crisis, and the news media finalizes that frame or
change the frames. In crises that transpire online, any individual who posts information about the
crisis provides additional framing, including crisis managers, crisis victims, bloggers, etc.
(Coombs, 2007, p. 171). All of these two-way social media contributors can be considered
citizen journalists in the context of this study. Citizen journalism, defined as the “collection,
dissemination, and analysis of news and information” (Dictionary, 2015), caused the trending of
the handbook policy change on Facebook following Dehlin’s initial post as the social media
posting, sharing, and commenting ultimately determined the public’s opinion and sentiment. The
frames crafted by the media, citizen journalists, and stakeholders should provide at least one
crisis type for the Church to tailor a strategized response.
Image Repair Theory. An organization’s image is a fluid impression formed by
stakeholders through interactions, both past and present, with the organization (Benoit & Pang,
2008), and this “image, face, or reputation is an important commodity” (Benoit, 2006, p.291).
Benoit’s (1995) image restoration theory, now known as image repair theory (Benoit & Pang,
2008), provides apologia strategies to minimize the threat to an organization’s image during a
crisis.
Benoit’s theory comes from several case studies with peers, penned over several years.
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The case studies analyze both organizations and individuals, such as AT&T’s long-distance
breakdown and subsequent investigation (Benoit & Brinson, 1994) and President George W.
Bush’s image repair efforts on Meet the Press (Benoit, 2006). There are two criteria that must be
met for an event to be labeled as an attack on the reputation of an organization: (a) the
occurrence of an undesirable act and (b) the following accusation of responsibility for the
undesirable act (Benoit, 1995, p. 71). If both elements are present, action must be taken to
protect the organization’s reputation. Benoit’s (1995) image restoration strategies are divided
into five broad categories: denial, evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective
action, and mortification. These strategies strongly influenced the strategies in SCCT.
Denial consists of two substrategies: simple denial and shifting the blame. Simple denial
takes place when an organization simply denies that the offensive act occurred, denies that the
organization was responsible for the offensive act, or denies that the offensive act caused harm.
Shifting the blame is when the accused organization blames someone else or a different
organization for the offensive act.
Evading responsibility has four substrategies: scapegoating, defeasibility, accident, and
good intentions (Benoit, 1995). Scapegoating, also known as provocation (Benoit, 1997), occurs
when an organization insists that their offensive act was a reasonable reaction that occurred on
account of someone else’s provocation (p.41). Defeasibility is defined as an organization’s
assertion that it had no control over the offensive act and/or lacked necessary information. An
organization can also claim that the offensive act was actually just an accident and therefore
beyond the organization’s control. Finally, an organization can claim it acted with good
intention, because “those who do improper actions while trying to do good are usually not held
as accountable as those who intend to do bad” (Benoit, 1997, p. 42).
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Benoit (1995) lists six substrategies to reduce an offensive act. Bolstering attempts to
increase stakeholders’ positive feelings towards the organization, hopefully negating any
negative feelings or experiences. Minimization is a downplaying of the offensive act so it does
not appear as damaging. Differentiation occurs when the organization compares the offensive act
to similar but more offensive actions. Transcendence attempts to frame the act in more favorable
context. Counterattack attempts to reduce the credibility of the attacking party. Compensation is
used to minimize negative feelings towards the organization by offering money, services, or
goods to stakeholders.
The fourth strategy found in image repair theory is corrective action, where the
organization corrects the issue at hand. This can include “restoring the situation to the state of
affairs before the objectionable action and/or promising to ‘mend one’s ways’ and make changes
to prevent the recurrence of the undesirable act” (Benoit, 1995, p .79). Corrective action does not
necessarily imply an admission of guilt.
The last strategy is simply to claim full responsibility for the offensive act and admit
guilt— mortification. If stakeholders feel the admission is sincere, they may forgive the
organization and positively move forward, thus ending the crisis. However, a negative aspect of
using mortification is the potential for victims of the crisis to attempt legal action.
Attribution Theory. Attribution theory informs many of the different aspects used in
situational crisis communication theory (Coombs, 2007). Attribution theory explores the various
ways people interpret and attach meaning to events and, more importantly, how people attribute
responsibility to those events (Weiner, 1986). In Weiner’s explanation of attribution theory, he
compared people to judges who “must rationally interpret evidence and reach a decision
regarding an alleged transgression of another” (p. 4). Because stakeholders have a need to
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attribute blame or cause for a crisis, this theory coincides naturally with studies of crisis
communication and organizational crises.
Additionally, Weiner (2006) found that sympathy “is experienced when the plight of
another is due to an uncontrollable cause” and that anger “is generated by a judgment of personal
responsibility for a transgression” (pp. 91-92). By applying this to an organizational crisis, it can
be deduced that when stakeholders feel the crisis was not caused by the organization, they will
most likely respond positively. Conversely, when stakeholders find the organization accountable,
the reaction will be negative. Jorgensen (1996) found that an organization’s confession and
apology could ease negative emotions and even improve attitudes toward the organization. The
research also uncovered “the degree of controllability and responsibility is highly linked to
negative emotions” (p. 349). As such, admittance of guilt is a double-edged sword because
confessions lead to higher attributions of responsibility resulting in increased negative emotion,
but the immediate apology often softens the reactions.
Crisis situations center on the audience just as much as the organization involved. SCCT
is also an audience-oriented theory, with a foundation of crisis responsibility. Attributions of
crisis responsibility are important because they “have a significant effect on how people perceive
the reputation of an organization in crisis and their affective and behavioral responses to an
organization following a crisis” (Coombs, 2012b, p. 38).
There are three causal branches people rely on when making attributions: stability,
controllability, and locus (Coombs, 1995). Stability measures whether or not a crisis has
happened before and the consistency of which it has happened. Controllability indicates if the
event was controllable or not, and Locus of control addresses any internal or external actors that
may have triggered the crisis.
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Evolution of SCCT
Coombs started developing SCCT in the mid-1990s, calling it the “symbolic approach”
(1995). Relying on attribution theory, he identified four factors affecting the attribution that
stakeholders make during a crisis: crisis type, veracity of evidence, damage, and performance
history. Coombs divided the factors using a crisis-type matrix depending on the corresponding
elements of attribution theory. In SCCT, locus of control falls in the internal/external dimension
of crises, while controllability is represented as unintentional/intentional events (see Table 2).
Internal signifies the event was caused by an organization, while external is due to an outside
force or person. An unintentional event denotes that the crisis did not happen on purpose, while
an intentional event was committed purposefully.
Table 2
Crisis Type Matrix
Unintentional

Intentional

External

Terrorism

Faux Pas

Internal

Accident

Transgression

Note. Adapted from “Choosing the Right Words: The Development of Guidelines for the
Selection of the ‘Appropriate’ Crisis-Response Strategies,” by W. T. Coombs, 1995,
Management Communication Quarterly, 8(4), p. 455.
The four possible crisis types (shown in Table 2) are faux pas, accident, transgression,
and terrorism. A faux pas is when an event where an external agent challenges an organization in
a specific event and attempts to turn it into a crisis, even if there is not one. Boycotts and protests
are typically associated with a faux pas. The organization only suffers minimal attribution in this
type of crisis. Accidents are unintentional, unpredictable, and generally also have minimal
attribution for the organization. Product defects, employee injuries, and natural disasters can all
be classified as accidents. Terrorism additionally falls into the minimal attribution category
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because it’s usually caused by an external actor and the organization is typically one of the
victims of the crisis. Examples of terrorism include product tampering, a hostage situation, and a
violent attack in the workplace. Transgressions, however, hold a high level of attribution for an
organization. Transgressions include purposefully selling a dangerous product, violating rules
and laws, and withholding safety information (Coombs, 1995, pp. 455–456).
Along with crisis types, Coombs created an additional three factors to close some of the
gaps that existed between variables in crisis perception and attributions. Veracity of the evidence
refers to the proof of a crisis event, with the evidence being found as true, false, or ambiguous.
Damage is the amount of destruction caused by the crisis event, classified by severe or minor,
and can include death, injuries, money loss, and environmental or property damage. In this
situation, stakeholders are divided into victims and non-victims, if applicable (Coombs,1995, pp.
457–461). Performance history is based on the stability factor mentioned in attribution theory. If
the organization has a history of similar crises, the cause of the crisis is considered to be stable.
In this case, the attribution of responsibility toward the organization will be high. If it does not
have a history of similar crises, the cause is unstable. This will cause the attribution of
responsibility to be low (Coombs, 1995, p. 461).
To handle these crisis perceptions and attributions, Coombs offered a playbook of crisis
response strategies, based to some extent on Benoit’s strategies, to be used in the restoration of
organizational image (see Table 3).

Table 3
Coombs’ Crisis Response Strategies
Strategy
Nonexistence strategies

Substrategy

Denial
Clarification

Sub-Substrategy
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Attack
Intimidation
Distance strategies

Excuse

Denial of intention
Denial of volition

Justification

Minimizing injury
Victim deserving
Misrepresentation of crisis event

Ingratiation strategies

Bolstering
Transcendence
Praising others

Mortification strategies

Remediation
Repentance
Rectification

Suffering strategy
Note. Adapted from “Choosing the Right Words: The Development of Guidelines for the
Selection of the ‘Appropriate’ Crisis-Response Strategies,” by W. T. Coombs, 1995,
Management Communication Quarterly, 8(4), p. 455
An organization will use nonexistence strategies for arguing that no crisis exists in the
first place. The clarification substrategy builds on nonexistence by providing an explanation
about why there is not a crisis (Coombs, 1995). The ingratiation strategies are an attempt by the
organization to regain public approval by associating with values and events the stakeholders
approve of. For example, bolstering is when the organization reminds the public of the positive
mission or acts by the organization. Additionally, transcendence can be used as an ingratiation
strategy similar to clarification to frame the crisis in a more desirable context.
Current SCCT framework. Although SCCT has evolved over the last 20 years, the core
of of the theory remains focused on crisis responsibility. The threat a crisis poses to an
organization is largely dependent on where responsibility for a crisis lies: “Attributions of crisis
responsibility have a significant effect on how people perceive the reputation of an organization
in crisis and their affective and behavioral responses to that organization following a crisis”
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(Coombs, 2012b, p. 38). Initially Coombs and Holladay sought to identify what variables shape
crisis responsibility and how those variables correlate to reputational threats (Coombs, 1995;
Coombs & Holladay, 1996, 2001, 2002). Those studies resulted in a two-step process for
assessing reputational threat during a crisis.
As a crisis starts, managers need to quickly determine the scale of the crisis the
organization is facing in terms of reputational threat. Coombs (2007) lists three factors that
contribute to reputational threat: initial crisis responsibility, crisis history, and prior relational
reputation. Initial crisis responsibility measures how much stakeholders believe the organization
is as fault for the crisis. Coombs further identifies three crisis clusters based on their relation to
crisis responsibility: victim, accidental, and preventable (better defined in Table 4).
When assessing reputational threat, crisis managers first need to identify the initial crisis
responsibility, namely establishing which crisis cluster the incident falls under. Secondly,
managers must consider the organization’s crisis history and prior reputation. If there are not any
past indiscretions in the organization’s history and the company is in good standing with the
stakeholders, the current crisis has a high chance of having a “halo effect” occur (Coombs &
Holladay, 2006). The halo effect can protect the organization from extreme negativity, but
conversely, if the organization has a storied history of crises, a “Velcro effect” occurs and all the
crises compound against the organization (Coombs & Holladay, 2001, p. 338).

Table 4
SCCT Crisis Types by Crisis Clusters
Cluster
Definition
Victim Cluster

The organization is
also a victim of the

Reputational Threat

Types

Weak attribution of
crisis responsibility;

Natural disaster
Rumor
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crisis.

mild reputational
threat

Workplace violence
Product
tampering/malevolence

Accidental Cluster

The organizational
actions leading to the
crisis were
unintentional.

Minimal attribution
of crisis
responsibility;
moderate
reputational threat

Challenges
Technical-error accidents
Technical-error product
harm

Preventable Cluster

The organization
knowingly placed
people at risk, took
inappropriate
actions, or violated a
law/regulation.

Strong attribution of
crisis responsibility;
severe reputational
threat

Human-error accidents
Human-error product
harm
Organizational misdeed
with no injuries
Organizational misdeed
management misconduct
Organizational misdeed
with injuries

Note. Adapted from “Protecting Organization Reputations During a Crisis: The Development
and Application of Situational Crisis Communication Theory.,” by W. T. Coombs, 2007,
Corporate Reputation Review, 10(3), p. 168.
Because the media created the crisis addressed in this thesis, the media and citizen
journalists identified the initial crisis responsibility, and in some cases these groups also
considered the Church’s history and prior reputation of handling homosexual behavior. SCCT
asserts that crisis managers need to select crisis response strategies depending on the specific
framing of the crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). Analyzing the framing of news reports and
social media posts for crisis types as found in Table 4 (Coombs, 2007, p. 168), should result in at
least one crisis cluster that will yield a recommended response strategy. Additionally, the Church
may identify or acknowledge a crisis frame in its responses. This leads to the following research
question:
RQ1a: Which of Coombs’ crisis types (e.g., challenges, organizational misdeed
management misconduct organizational misdeed with injuries, etc.) did the media, citizen
journalists, John Dehlin, and the Church use when framing the handbook policy change?
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RQ1b: How did these frames vary by crisis phase (e.g., crisis, postcrisis)?

Crisis Response Strategies. After properly evaluating the reputational threat, a
corresponding response should be employed. Although, Coombs advises “every crisis response
strategy should begin with instructing and adjusting information” (2012b, p. 40). Instructing
information puts a priority on communication with stakeholders to alleviate any real or potential
physical harm. Adjusting information furthers stakeholder communication to include protecting
against any psychological harm. This kind of communication may involve sharing basic details
about the crisis. It also may include communicating plans for corrective action or preventative
action. Lastly, the strategy can include expressions of concern and sympathy for victims, which
is not an admission of guilt (Coombs, 2012a).
If the crisis situation has minimal attribution, the organization has had no similar crises in
the past, and a good relationship with stakeholders exists, instructing and adjusting information
can be an adequate crisis response (Coombs, 2007). However, if all of those conditions are not
met, crisis managers must advance to higher-level strategies corresponding to the level of
attribution, crisis history, and prior relationship status.
Primary-level crisis response strategies include deny, diminish, and rebuild. And
organization uses deny strategies in hopes of disconnecting the organization from the crisis.
Diminishing is a strategy which lessens crisis responsibility or minimizes the perceived damage
the crisis has caused. Organizations rebuild when they make positive actions to improve favor
with stakeholders (Coombs, 2007).
Three bolstering strategies make up the secondary-level strategies, providing positive
information about the organization to offset negative feelings. Coombs (2006) warns these
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strategies are not solo strategies and are meant to supplement the initial and primary strategies
mentioned previously (Coombs, 2007).
Table 5 provides a comprehensive summary of every SCCT strategy.
Table 5
SCCT Crisis Response Strategies
Strategy Level
Crisis Response
Initial

Primary

Secondary

Strategy

Instructing information

Protection

Adjusting information

Crisis basics
Corrective action
Express concern for
victim(s)

Deny

Attack the accuser
Denial
Scapegoat

Diminish

Excuse
Justification

Rebuild

Compensation
Apology

Bolstering

Reminder
Ingratiation
Victimage

Note. Adapted from “Protecting Organization Reputations During a Crisis: The Development
and Application of Situational Crisis Communication Theory.,” by W. T. Coombs, 2007,
Corporate Reputation Review, 10(3), p. 170.
While SCCT offers guidelines for forming crisis response strategies based on attribution
level, crisis history, and prior relational reputation with stakeholders, it is important for crisis
managers to match the response appropriately and not be aggressive with responses (Lambert,
2015). Using overly accommodating strategies can worsen the situation by making stakeholders
think a crisis is worse than it actually is (Coombs, 2007).
Additional crisis response strategy guidelines are listed in Table 6.
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Table 6
SCCT Crisis Response Strategy Guidelines
1. Informing and adjusting information alone can be enough when crises have minimal
attribution of crisis responsibility (victim crises), no history of similar crises, and a
neutral or positive prior relationship reputation.
2. Victimage can be used as part of the response for workplace violence, product tampering,
natural disasters, and rumors.
3. Diminish crisis response strategies should be used for crises with minimal attribution of
crisis responsibility
4. Diminish crisis response strategies should be used for crises with low attribution of crisis
responsibility (accident crises), no history of similar crises, and a neutral or positive prior
relationship reputation.
5. Rebuild crisis response strategies should be used for crises with low attribution of crisis
responsibility (accident crises), coupled with a history of similar crises and/or negative
prior relationship reputation.
6. Rebuild crisis response strategies should be used for crises with strong attribution of
crisis responsibility (preventable crises) regardless of crisis history or prior relationship
reputation.
7. The deny crisis response strategies should be used for rumor and challenge crises, when
possible.
8. Maintain consistency in crisis response strategies. Mixing deny crisis response strategies
with either the diminish or rebuild strategies will erode the effectiveness of the overall
response.
Note. Adapted from “Protecting Organization Reputations During a Crisis: The Development
and Application of Situational Crisis Communication Theory.,” by W. T. Coombs, 2007,
Corporate Reputation Review, 10(3), p. 173.
The target audience is also a large factor that cannot be ignored in crisis response. Both
victims and nonvictims make up the two broad audiences for a crisis message. Anyone injured,
whether physically, emotionally, psychologically, or monetarily by the crisis, can be considered
a victim. Nonvictims are those who are associated with the crisis as potential victims and/or
voyeurs. While victims may need to be addressed first, potential victims and voyeurs are also
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key players because “if these audiences dislike the crisis response, it will damage their
relationships and future interactions with the organization in crisis” (Coombs, 2015, p. 139).
Building on the answer to RQ1, the Church should have used an appropriately
corresponding “response strategy” and “guideline” (Coombs, 2007, pp.170, 173) found in Tables
5 and 6 respectively. Additionally, stakeholders may identify and/or claim the Church is using
specific response strategies, which may have an effect on the persuasiveness of the response.
This leads to a second research question presented in four parts:
RQ2a: Which specific crisis response strategies (e.g., protection, crisis basics, denial,
justification, etc.) did the Church use in responding to the crisis?
RQ2b: Are the crisis response strategies used in the Church’s communication reflected in
the media coverage about the issue by the news media, citizen journalists, and John
Dehlin?
RQ2c: How did the crisis response strategies used by the Church vary throughout the
crisis timeline?
RQ2d: How did the crisis response strategies identified by the media, citizen journalists,
and John Dehlin vary throughout the crisis timeline?
Just like any new theory, SCCT has its limitations. The financial standing of an
organization may affect which strategy an organization can employ. Legal ramifications can also
impede a crisis response strategy. Tyler (1996) noted that even though a crisis may warrant an
apology, “the threat of legal liability and consequent threat of corporate extinction make an
admission of guilt unwise and perhaps even immoral” (p. 59). Coombs acknowledged these
limitations, observing that if an organization admits responsibility, it can potentially lose a
lawsuit and bankrupt itself in court fees (Coombs, 2015). If an organization finds itself in such a
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predicament, Coombs (2007) advised the “next best” strategy should be used.
Most poignantly for this thesis, there is an additional limitation not yet recognized in
SCCT literature: there is no recommended response strategy for an organization that
acknowledges the crisis of stakeholders but does not intend to apologize, instead holding to its
institutional values. Although there is existing literature on religion and crisis communication, all
of the literature involves wrongdoing by the religious institution or its members. For example, in
the case of the child abuse committed by Roman Catholic priests, not only were children
physically harmed, but the priests were also violating the Church’s policies of abuse and
celibacy. Even in its own recent past, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has issued
an apology for violating a promise to refrain from posthumously baptizing members of the
Jewish faith (Niebuhr, 1995). But in both cases, the churches were at fault for violating some
kind of law or agreement. Little to no research has been conducted on how a religious or secular
institution should handle an accusation of wrong doing when the organization has not broken a
law or violated its own policies.
Coombs’ situational crisis communication theory is centered on protecting the reputation
of an organization during a crisis (Coombs, 2015). If SCCT works effectively, a crisis manager
should employ the appropriate “crisis response strategy” to its matching “crisis type” resulting in
improved sentiment towards the organization under crisis (Coombs, 2007, pp. 170, 168).
However, if an organization cannot acknowledge a crisis, it is unlikely for that organization to
accept any framing of crisis type and even more unlikely for an organization to use a crisis
response strategy that corresponds to the crisis type. Protecting reputation is still important to an
organization, even when apologizing is not an option.
This thesis shows that the Church may still use some of Coombs’ crisis response
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strategies in its messages, but whether or not those strategies are effective can only be
determined through a change in sentiment. Examining a change in sentiment following the
Church’s responses during the crisis may demonstrate further strengths and weaknesses of
Coombs’ SCCT model. This leads to a third research question:
RQ3: How did sentiment towards the Church as found in news stories, blog posts, and
John Dehlin’s social media vary throughout the crisis phases?
Additionally, this research aims to identify and test the effectiveness of best practices for
crisis planning, management, and recovery. Employing a form of grounded theory can provide
recommendations for improving “organizational and professional practice” (Seeger, 2006, p.232)
and close “the gap between desired practice and current practice” (Steelman & McCaffrey, 2012,
p.700). As the Church has previous experience dealing with similar crises where an apology is
not issued, the Church is likely to have developed its own strategy for responding. Capturing any
additional strategy used by the Church or insights from the handbook policy change crisis may
identify gaps between current SCCT recommendations and desired outcomes. Therefore, a final
research question is posed:
RQ4: Based upon this crisis, what are the strengths and weaknesses of Coombs’ SCCT?
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Chapter 3: Methodology
In order to analyze the effectiveness of the crisis response strategies employed by The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, both the media about the change and the Church’s
crisis communication messages were retrieved. Using content analysis, the reports and messages
were examined through the lens of Coombs’ SCCT model, which allows categorization of the
messages according to SCCT, analysis of their effectiveness, and the defining of SCCT
challenges in analyzing this organizational conflict.
Data Collection
In the context of this study, the term media includes news reports, blog posts, and social
media posts from John Dehlin’s Facebook account. The unit of analysis is one news article, blog,
social media post, or response from the Church that discussed the Church handbook revisions. In
order to cover the duration of the crisis, the collected media was published between November 5,
2015, and November 15, 2015. The official letter from Church leadership notifying lay leaders
about the change was dated November 3, 2015, but was not leaked until November 5. Eight days
later, Church spokesman Michael Otterson offered final clarification on the issue in a blog article
posted on the Church media site mormonnewsroom.org. The pivotal moments of the handbook
crisis fell between these eight days, but the timeline was extended to November 15, 2015, to
capture any responses immediately following the Church’s final statement.
Gathered news reports were limited to traditional television, news radio, and newspaper
outlets. I used the database LexisNexis Academic to collect media reports about the handbook
policy change within the measured time frame using the search terms “Mormon,” “LDS
Church,” and “handbook.”
Personal blog posts were gathered from popular publishing sites WordPress.com and
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Blogspot.com. Blog posts were found using a customized Google search to specifically look
through WordPress and Blogspot for posts mentioning the words “Mormon,” “LDS,” and
“handbook” within the duration of the crisis. One of the limitations of collecting blog posts is
that the search only returned blog posts that have been selected by the author to be publicly
available. Additionally, influential bloggers with large followings may be publishing on their
own web domains and therefore be excluded from the search. However, a preliminary search of
WordPress and Blogspot returned more than 70 relevant results with a spectrum of opinions on
the issue.
Social media posts collected were limited to the personal Facebook account for John
Dehlin during the determined time frame. Although Dehlin has both a public Facebook page and
personal Facebook account, he rarely posts on his public page, and when he does post, it is
copied content from his personal page. His personal account publishes publicly, and posts were
collected directly from Dehlin’s personal page. Although the choice to focus solely on Dehlin
seems limiting in terms of a social media sample, Dehlin’s framing and sentiment is pivotal to
this study. Dehlin was integral in identifying the crisis, alerting the news media to the policy
change, and influencing the media coverage. As a former member of the Church, Dehlin is likely
to have a consistently negative opinion of the Church. Dehlin’s views serve as a perfect opposite
to the Church as an organization in terms of recognizing the crisis: the Church saw no need to
communicate with stakeholders about the change, whereas Dehlin alerted the masses.
Finally, all official responses from The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
regarding the handbook policy change within the set time period were collected. These responses
were mostly found on mormonnewsroom.org. Content from the site includes a video interview
with Church leader Elder D. Todd Christofferson, an additional letter from Church leadership,
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and the clarifying blog post by spokesman Michael Otterson. Additionally, there were two brief
comments made to the media on November 5 and November 14 covering the initial news of the
change and a response to a protesting group resigning from the Church en masse in response to
the change. These official comments from the Church were collected from the news reports
gathered in the Lexis Nexis search.
Procedure
To answer RQ1a, I examined the news reports, blog posts and social media posts to
identify framing that used Coombs’ crisis types (2007, p.168; Table 4). Although Coombs’
divides his crisis types into three crisis clusters (i.e., victim, accidental, and preventable), the
victim cluster of crisis types does not apply because the handbook policy change was not a
natural disaster, rumor, workplace violence, or product tampering by an external agent.
Furthermore, some of the crisis types found in accidental and preventable clusters that involve
equipment failure (accidental), industrial accidents (preventable), or a recalled product
(preventable) are not applicable to the policy change. This narrowed the focus of the study to
code specifically for one of four different crisis frames (Coombs, 2007, p.168):
•

Challenges: the organization is unaware or unintentionally acting in an
inappropriate manner (accidental cluster)

•

Organizational misdeed with no injuries: the organization acted intentionally but
there was no physical or emotional harm (preventable cluster)

•

Organizational misdeed management misconduct: the organization violated laws
or regulations (preventable cluster)

•

Organizational misdeed with injuries: the organization intentionally put
stakeholders at risk and there is physical or emotional harm (preventable cluster)

The Church statements were also coded for crisis type in case the Church were to specifically
reference how the handbook policy change had been framed by the different stakeholders.
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To answer RQ1a, the most popularly framed crisis type among news media, bloggers,
and John Dehlin was identified. This data also provided evidence for whether the Church
publicly acknowledged any crisis framing from those stakeholder groups.
To answer RQ1b, the framing of crisis types was identified by date in order to determine
if there were shifts in how the stakeholders and the Church framed the crisis throughout the 11day period.
To answer RQ2a, the Church’s statements were coded to identify which of Coombs’ 14
recommended crisis response strategies were present in each statement (Coombs, 2007, p.170):
•

Protection: provide information for what stakeholders can do to protect from
physical/emotional harm

•

Crisis basics: provide information about the crisis (i.e., who, what, when, where,
why, and how)

•

Corrective action: supply information on what is being done to protect
stakeholders from future crises.

•

Express concern for victims: this is not an admission of guilt, but often expected
by stakeholders

•

Attack the accuser: confront the person or group claiming something is wrong
with the organization

•

Denial: assert there is no crisis

•

Scapegoat: blame some person or group outside of the organization for the crisis

•

Excuse: minimize organization’s responsibility by denying intent to do harm or
claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis

•

Justification: minimize the perceived damage caused by the crisis

•

Compensation: offer money or other gifts to victims

•

Apology: indicate the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks
for forgiveness

•

Reminder: tell stakeholders about the past good works of the organization
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•

Ingratiation: praise stakeholders or reminds them of past good works of the
organization

•

Victimage: remind stakeholders that the organization is a victim of the crisis too

To answer RQ2b, the news articles, blog posts, and social media posts were coded to
identify which of Coombs’ response strategies used by the Church were identified in the articles,
blogs, and social media posts of each stakeholder group. After identifying which strategies the
stakeholder groups recognized in the Church statements, the identified response strategies were
compared to the actual response strategies used by the Church.
RQ2c accounted for any changes in response strategies used by the Church in different
phases of the crisis. The data was coded for publishing date to analyze day by day response
strategy changes. RQ2d tracked daily change in response strategies identified by news media,
bloggers, and John Dehlin.
To answer RQ3, I tracked change in sentiment of the examined media over time.
Sentiment was measured using a three-point scale to measure positive, neutral, and negative
sentiment holistically in each piece of media. Each group’s sentiment was analyzed on a daily
basis to determine shifts in sentiment throughout the crisis.
RQ4 provides an overarching analysis of how the Church’s strategy in responding to the
handbook policy change crisis fits into SCCT in terms of successful execution and lack of
appropriate response options. This question compared the crisis response strategies used by the
Church (identified in RQ2a) to Coombs’ recommendations for responding to the crisis based on
the crisis-type frames (identified in RQ1a), looking for cohesion. If the Church’s response
strategy was effective, there should be a shift in the framing of crisis types and/or sentiment
during the duration of the crisis as the Church responded. The central topic of this study being

38
the premise that organizations may not always see the need to apologize or cannot apologize for
a crisis, RQ4 uses all the data collected to analyze the Church’s strategic response when SCCT
does not provide an applicable recommendation. Analyzing changes in sentiment following
specific crisis response strategies should demonstrate what did or did not work for the Church in
terms of Coombs’ crisis types and crisis response strategies. The coding sheet was used to collect
statements from the Church responses that diverge from SCCT to illustrate what strategies the
Church used to respond to the crisis outside of Coombs’ recommendations.
The coding instrument included the type of media, name of media, date and time of the
publication, crisis type, level of sentiment, and crisis response strategy (see Appendix: Coding
Sheet and Codebook).
Data Analysis
To achieve intercoder reliability, another communications scholar and I randomly
selected and coded 10% of each media type (i.e., news reports, blog posts, social media posts)
(Wimmer & Dominick, 2003). Using Scott’s pi, our lowest reliability coefficient was .83, with
most of the agreement hovering between 90 and 100%. After achieving a useable reliability
coefficient, I coded the rest of the data by myself.
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Chapter 4: Analysis and Results
During the 11 days of news coverage (from November 5 to November 15) as the
handbook change crisis unfolded, there were 60 different news articles of both local and national
media coverage, 70 blog posts written by 48 different authors, 56 Facebook posts from John
Dehlin, and 5 official statements from the Church. The number of articles, blog posts, and social
media posts from news media, bloggers, and John Dehlin gradually started to decrease on
November 9, four days into the crisis. Those numbers did spike on November 13 as the Church
released two more statements about the handbook change, but the numbers were not nearly as
high as they were during the intial days of the crisis (shown in Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Number of news articles, blogs, and social media posts throughout the handbook policy change.

Although a chi-square would have been ideal for showing significance in trends across
the timeline of the crisis to answer RQ 1b, 2b, 2d, and 3, 70–80% of the expected counts were
less than five (Yates, Moore & McCabe, 1999, p. 734), not allowing for chi-square analysis.
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Examination of Crisis Frames
To answer RQ1a, or “Which of Coombs’ crisis types did the media, citizen journalists,
John Dehlin, and the Church use when framing the handbook policy change?” the collected data
was analyzed for the four applicable crisis frames of challenge, organizational misdeed without
injury, organizational misdeed management misconduct, and organizational misdeed with injury.
Table 7 shows the number of times each frame was used by the differing groups throughout the
crisis.
Table 7
Frame of Crisis Type by Stakeholder Group
Crisis Type

News Media

Blog Posts

John Dehlin

Church

53.3% (32)

18.6% (13)

21.4% (12)

0% (0)

Org. Misdeed without Injuries

0% (0)

2.9% (2)

5.4% (3)

0% (0)

Org. Misdeed Management Misconduct

0% (0)

1.4% (1)

0% (0)

0% (0)

46.67% (28)

55.7% (39)

44.6% (25)

0% (0)

0% (0)

21.4% (15)

28.6% (16)

100% (5)

60

70

56

5

Challenge

Org. Misdeed with Injuries
No Crisis Frame
Sample Total

The news media were split almost evenly between labeling the event as a challenge
(53.3%) or organizational misdeed with injuries (46.67%), with the majority of articles framing
the crisis as a challenge. News media was also the only group that always framed the event as a
crisis compared to the three other groups that did not identify a crisis frame more than 20% of
the time. Bloggers (55.7%) and John Dehlin (44.6%) most often framed the crisis as an
organizational misdeed, but the second highest score for both of those groups was no crisis
framing. As expected, the Church did not recognize the handbook change as a crisis at all.
The data for RQ1b, or “How did the frames vary by crisis phase?” illustrates a
substantial shift across most groups on November 13.
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As Figure 2 shows, the news media only used two crisis frames: challenge and
organizational misdeed with injuries. Although the challenge frame was more following the first
Church statement (November 5), organizational misdeed with injuries became the most
commonly used frame as the Church stopped making statements and more individuals came
forward about their suffering due to the policy. Because news media always framed the
handbook change as a crisis, as the frame of challenge rose, the frame of organizational misdeed
with injuries declined and vice versa.
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Figure 2. News media frames used throughout handbook policy crisis. Note that percentages indicate the per-day
percentages.

Although organizational misdeed with injuries was the most frequently used frame by
bloggers on a daily basis, half of the blog entries briefly stopped framing the policy change as a
crisis (50%) following the second wave of Church statements on November 13 with a lack of
crisis framing (see Figure 3). Then organizational misdeed with injuries regained the majority of
blog framing as policy dissenters organized a mass resignation of membership from the Church
on November 14. A trend occurred between organizational misdeed with injury and no crisis
frame. As the organizational misdeed with injury frame rises, there is a decrease in the no crisis
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frame and vice versa. Even though bloggers used all four crisis frames throughout the crisis, the
challenge and organizational misdeed management misconduct are not as prevalent.
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Figure 3. Blogger frames used throughout handbook policy crisis. There were no blog posts on November 12. Note
that percentages indicate the per-day percentages.

John Dehlin’s social media posts are particularly interesting because framing remains
relatively consistent throughout the first half of the crisis timeline (see Figure 4). On November
6, his posts were ironically split between framing the crisis as an organizational misdeed with
injuries and not recognizing the change as a crisis. Organizational misdeed with injuries is the
most prevalent frame used by Dehlin. Halfway through the crisis Dehlin created a website called
Suffer the Little Children, criticizing the Church for creating a policy that opposes its own
scripture. The website accuses the Church of misunderstanding its own doctrine more than his
previous Facebook posts did, and the frame of incompetency (Challenge) briefly overpowered
the frame of organizational misdeed with injuries on November 11. As Dehlin started to focus
more on the website on November 12, his organizational misdeed with injuries framing rose
from 33% to 100%. On November 13, half of Dehlin’s posts (50%) were solely re-sharing the
clarifications from the Church without framing the information. It had been four days since
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Dehlin had commented on the crisis without attributing a frame, but as Dehlin started to
publically process the information, his organizational misdeed with injury frame dominated the
whole of his posts for the rest of the crisis timeline at 100%.
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

11/5/15 11/6/15 11/7/15 11/8/15 11/9/15 11/10/15 11/11/15 11/12/15 11/13/15 11/14/15 11/15/15
Challenge

Org. Misdeed without Injuries

Org. Misdeed Management Misconduct

Org. Misdeed with Injuries

No Crisis Frame

Figure 4. John Dehlin frames used throughout handbook policy crisis. Note that percentages indicate the per-day
percentages

As Figure 5 shows, the Church never recognized the handbook policy change as a crisis.
The Church released an intitial statement to news media on November 5 and created a video with
contextual information on the policy on November 6. The gaps in the Church’s framing timeline
represent the Church’s silence between statements. On November 13 the Church released two
different responses: a clarification on the policy change and a blog post from Church spokesman
Michael Otterson with more detail and insight on the policy change.
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Figure 5. Church frames used throughout handbook policy crisis. There were no statements issued November 7-12,
15. Note percentages indicate the per-day percentages.

Examination of Crisis Response Strategies
To answer RQ2a “What specific crisis response strategies did the Church use in
responding to the crisis?” I examined specific crisis response strategies employed by the Church.
As Table 8 shows, of the 14 recommended SCCT crisis response strategies, the Church used
seven of the strategies multiple times throughout its five responses (in order of most prevalent
response): crisis basics, express concern for victims, justification, reminder, protection, excuse,
and ingratiation. Additionally, coding found that the Church used additional tactics of referring
stakeholders to its long history of opposing same-sex marriage and defending its value of
heterosexual marriage in three of the five responses. By reminding stakeholders of the Church’s
history and reasons for opposing same-sex marriage (i.e., same-sex marriage is against the
teachings of Jesus Christ), the “other” strategy places the burden of acting to resolve the crisis on
the stakeholders. It is as though the Church is saying, “We don’t have a problem. You have a
problem. So you should fix the problem you have.”
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Table 8
Crisis Response Strategies Used by Church, Identified by Stakeholders
Response Strategy

News Media

Blog Posts

John Dehlin

Church Media

1.7% (1)

5.71% (4)

1.8% (1)

40% (2)

58.3% (35)

38.6% (27)

12.5% (7)

100% (5)

Corrective Action

0

0

1.8% (1)

0

Express Concern

0

0

0

80% (4)

Attack the Accuser

0

0

0

0

Denial

0

0

0

0

Scapegoat

0

0

0

0

Excuse

0

0

0

40% (2)

26.7% (16)

17.1% (12)

1.8% (1)

60% (3)

Compensation

0

0

0

0

Apology

0

0

0

0

Reminder

0

0

0

60% (3)

Ingratiation

0

0

0

40% (2)

Victimage

0

0

0

0

Other

0

0

0

60% (3)

Protection
Crisis Basics

Justification

Note. Percentages indicate percentage of articles identifying specific crisis responses out of the total
number of articles in each stakeholder group.

RQ2b compares the crisis response strategies identified in messages by the Church (see
RQ2a) and compares them to the strategies acknowledged by stakeholders (i.e., media, bloggers,
and John Dehlin). Although the Church used eight response strategies in its messages about the
handbook policy change (see Table 8), the news media, bloggers, and John Dehlin only
recognized the Church as using three of these same strategies: protection, crisis basics, and
justification. Table 8 shows how rarely those response strategies were acknowledged by
stakeholders. There were also several news articles (13.3%), blog entries (38.6%), and social
media posts (82.1%) that didn’t refer to any crisis response strategy used by the Church. This is
interesting to note because it illustrates that the news media is more likely to attempt to identify
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an organization’s response strategies whereas bloggers and John Dehlin were more focused on
how the responses impacted individual people.
Crisis basics was the most recognized strategy by the stakeholders. It was also the most
used strategy by the Church. However, the Church used the expressing concern strategy in 80%
of its responses, yet none of the groups identified expressing concern as a Church strategy.
Additionally, John Dehlin predicted the Church statement clarifying the updated policy
would lead to corrective action.
To answer RQ2c “How did the crisis response strategies (e.g., protection, crisis basics,
justification, etc.) used by the Church vary between crisis phases?” the crisis response strategies
were examined over the duration of the crisis looking for a change in use. Figure 6 illustrates that
during its initial brief response on the day the handbook changes were leaked, the Church only
employed crisis basics, acknowledging the crisis existed and explaining its long history of
opposing same-sex marriage. This was most likely due to the limited amount of time to craft a
statement. John Dehlin first leaked the handbook change at 3 p.m. on November 5, and local
news were referring to the brief Church statement that evening. In its second, lengthier, video
response the Church included seven of its eight strategies.
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Figure 6. Church response strategies used throughout the crisis. The x-axis describes the number of statements the
Church released per day (e.g. on November 13 there were two released statements and each statement included
response strategies of crisis basics, express concern, justification, and ingratiation).

A week later on November 13, the Church released two responses: the clarifying statement and
the blog post by Michael Otterson. All eight strategies were used that day. Both of the responses
included crisis basics, expressions of concern for victims, justification, and ingratiation, but only
the clarifying statement used protection, excuse, and reminder. Otterson’s blog post employed
the additional “other” strategy of referring to the historic teachings and practices of the Church in
relation to same-sex marriage:
This sensitivity to family circumstances is practiced elsewhere. For example, the Church
doesn’t baptize minor children without parental consent, even if the children want to be
associated with their LDS friends. That is where Church leaders stand today—holding
firm to the doctrinal position of right and wrong, while extending love to all people.
(Otterson, 2015)
As dissenters to the handbook policy change planned to stage a mass resignation, the
Church issued one more brief statement on November 14 reaffirming its position on same-sex
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marriage and expressing sympathy and love towards those who disagreed.
RQ2d explored the change of identified crisis response strategies by the stakeholder
groups throughout the duration of the crisis. Stakeholder acknowledgement of the protection
crisis response strategy, as shown in Figure 7, is relatively low, but bloggers recognize it more
often following the day that the Church clarified the policy and confirmed the Church would
only bar the children of same-sex couples who had majority custody over the children on
November 14.
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Figure 7. Acknowledgement of protection response strategy by stakeholders throughout handbook policy change
crisis. Note that percentages indicate the per-day percentages. Blue lines indicate the dates the Church actually used
protection strategy.

In addition to the protection crisis response strategy, the stakeholder groups also referred
to the Church’s strategy of providing a crisis basics response strategy. Bound to report the who,
what, where, when and why of a crisis, news media referred to the Church’s strategy of
providing crisis basics most often of the three stakeholder groups and continued to refer to that
strategy for several days following the initial statements (see Figure 8). The second wave of
statements from the Church resonated more with bloggers as they may have had more time to
process and gather information.
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Figure 8. Acknowledgement of crisis basics response strategy by stakeholders throughout handbook policy change
crisis. Note that percentages indicate the per-day percentages. Blue lines indicate the dates the Church actually used
crisis basics strategy.

Justification, where a crisis manager attempts to minimize the perceived damage by
providing a reason for the crisis, was the second most referred to strategy in this crisis by the
stakeholders. In the context of this crisis, the justification strategy was used by the Church to
minimize perceived damage in terms of explaining that the Church does not harbor an ill will
toward same-sex couples and their children, but that the handbook policy update was needed to
help distinguish between moral right and wrong. Figure 9 shows two large peaks for news
media’s recognition of the justification strategy on November 8 (50%) and November 11 (67%).
These recognitions accompanied news reports trying to analyze the policy and include opinions
from different scholars and opinion leaders. Additionally, there is a large spike in
acknowledgement of justification crisis response strategy by bloggers (75%) on November 13 as
the Church released the second wave of clarifying information.
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Figure 9. Acknowledgement of justification response strategy by stakeholders throughout handbook policy change
crisis. Note that percentages indicate the per-day percentages. Blue lines indicate the dates the Church actually used
justification strategy.

John Dehlin didn’t refer to the Church’s response strategy very often in his social media
posts. However, on one occasion he incorrectly predicted a response strategy of corrective in
future Church strategy to undo the policy change as shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Acknowledgement of corrective action response strategy by stakeholders throughout handbook policy
change crisis. Note that percentages indicate the per-day percentages.
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Evaluating Sentiment
To answer RQ3, inquiring how different stakeholder groups viewed the Church
throughout different phases of the crisis, the content’s sentiment from each group was identified
by the number of articles expressing negative, neutral, and positive sentiment each day. As
Figure 11 shows, the news media never used positive sentiment while reporting on the handbook
policy change. Neutral sentiment was most prevalent, but negative sentiment did spike during the
Church’s seven-day period of silence between statements. With a lack of Church response and
more people speaking out about how the policy impacted their lives negatively, the media
struggled to keep the reports balanced.
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Figure 11. News media sentiment over time. Note that percentages indicate the per-day percentages.

The majority of the analyzed blog posts were written by authors who were seemingly
motivated to write about the policy change because they either saw it as a crisis and wanted to
express their frustration and hurt or they felt the need to defend the policy change and speak
positively of the Church. Figure 12 shows that 60% of the blog posts were positive toward the
Church with the other 40 maintaining a neutral tone on the first day of the policy change leak.
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Following the Church’s first responses, positive sentiment was replaced by negative sentiment,
which consistently prevailed at a daily percentage of 50–60% throughout most of the timeline.
However, positive sentiment returned immediately following the second wave of statements
from the Church with 50% of the blog responses holding positive sentiment with neutral and
negative sentiment equaling 25% each.
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Figure 12. Blogger sentiment over time. Note that percentages indicate the per-day percentages. There were no blog
posts on November 12.

Dehlin, like the news media, never spoke positively about the policy change. When
Dehlin’s posts contained neutral sentiment it was because he was merely sharing neutral facts
about the policy change without sharing his opinion on the matter. Although he started out more
neutral, as Dehlin acknowledged a growing number of people impacted by the policy, his content
became increasingly negative (see Figure 13). However, several times throughout the crisis, on
November 7, 9, and 13, Dehlin was equally divided between negative and neutral sentiment. This
is notable because his posts on November 7 and 13 immediately followed Church statements.
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Figure 13. John Dehlin sentiment over time. Note that percentages indicate the per-day percentages.

Evaluating SCCT
To answer RQ4, I used all of the data collected for RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3 to analyze this
crisis situation in the context of SCCT. Because the Church did not recognize the handbook
policy change as a crisis or publicly acknowledge the stakeholders’ frames of crisis, it could not
truly use SCCT to begin crafting its response. However, if the Church understood that
stakeholders were most often framing the handbook policy change as a preventable crisis,
specifically an organizational misdeed with injuries, the Church should have used a combination
of intial, primary, and secondary levels of crisis response strategies. Additionally, because of the
high attribution of responsibility associated with a crisis of organizational misdeed with injuries
and the long-standing history of the Church in regards to opposing same-sex marriage, there
should have been a strong emphasis on the “rebuilding” response strategies of apology and
compensation. In its responses the Church did not ever use a rebuilding strategy, but it did use all
three levels of crisis response strategies: protection and crisis basics (initial level), excuse and
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justification (primary level), and reminder and ingratiation (secondary level).
Furthermore the Church’s custom response strategies did appear to shift crisis framing
and sentiment in multiple stakeholder groups near the end of the 11-day timeline.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
This study analyzes The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints’ crisis
communication strategies during a controversial handbook policy change by using Coombs’
situational crisis communication theory. Using content analysis to track framing, sentiment, and
strategic responses and categorizing these variables by their corresponding SCCT strategy,
effectiveness and appropriateness of the Church’s crisis communication was gauged.
This report offers insight into potentially effective strategies that an organization can use
in a crisis situation when the organization does not intend to apologize or recognize a crisis. The
descriptive data from this study shows a change in multiple stakeholder groups in crisis framing
and sentiment.
Understanding the Crisis Timeline
Because there were multiple responses from the Church throughout the 11-day period,
this crisis can be contextualized into three different phases:
1. The intial wave as news broke of the handbook policy change and the Church’s response,
between November 5–7
2. The philosophical resting period between November 8–12 as stakeholders continued to
process and analyze the change despite the Church’s silence
3. The second wave of Church responses clarifying the policy and the following reaction
from stakeholders, between November 13–15.
The most used frame during the first and second phases of the crisis among all three
stakeholder groups was organizational misdeed with injuries. That frame increased during the
second phase as more people affected by the policy shared their stories with news media and on
social media.
The majority of sentiment during the first phase of the crisis started out neutral for news
media and John Dehlin, and positive for bloggers. However, negative sentiment became the
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majority across all three groups following the Church’s video response with Elder
Christofferson. The negative sentiment carried through the second phase as the Church did not
provide any additional context and stakeholders continued to discuss the negative implications of
the policy.
The third phase of the crisis, when the Church resumed making statements about the
policy change, shows a shift in framing and sentiment in multiple stakeholder groups.
Stakeholders also referred to response strategies used by the Church more often in the third
phase than in the first and second phases of the crisis. I will now discuss this third phase in more
detail.
Blogger and Dehlin framing and sentiment changes on November 13. The Church’s
second wave of statements on November 13 had a substantial impact on crisis framing and
sentiment in posts by bloggers and social media commentary by John Dehlin. On November 11,
62% of the blog posts had negative sentiment toward the Church, and 75% of the blog posts
framed the crisis as an organzational misdeed with injury, meaning bloggers were framing the
handbook policy change as an intentional, wrongful act by the Church that caused emotional or
physical harm. After the clarifying statement and blog post from the Church published the
morning of November 13, only 25% of the blog posts were negative toward the Church with
50% of the blog posts showing positive sentiment, which had been nonexistent on November 11.
Additionally, the 75% of blog posts framing the crisis as an organizational misdeed also dropped
to only 25%, while 50% of blog posts did not frame the change as a crisis at all. The dramatic
shift in sentiment and crisis framing over a single day of content (there were not any blog posts
on November 12) indicates that the Church may have crafted an effective response strategy for
bloggers in its second wave of responses.
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John Dehlin never wrote positively of the Church throughout the crisis, but his framing
and negative sentiment also softened with the second wave of Church statements. On November
12 Dehlin’s sentiment was 100% negative and his framing was 100% organizational misdeed
with injury, meaning that for that day Dehlin was entirely framing the handbook policy change
as an intentional, wrongful act by the Church that caused emotional or physical harm. The next
day, November 13, as Church statements were released Dehlin’s posts were 50% negative and
50% neutral. Additionally, the frame of organizational misdeed with injury dropped from 100%
to only 38%, while 50% of Dehlin’s posts did not identify a crisis frame. On November 14 all
negativity disappeared as Dehlin was 100% neutral in his sentiment towards the Church.
Church response strategies on November 13. Examining the strategies that resonated
with bloggers and Dehlin during the second wave of Church statements may explain the decrease
in negativity and softening of crisis framing. On November 13 the Church used crisis basics
twice as much as it had in its initial response, and bloggers paid attention. Every blog post on
November 13 referred to the Church providing more information about the handbook policy
change (crisis basics). It did not matter if the blog post had positive sentiment:
This came out today, and should clarify many points people have been upset about. . . . It
pays to not get too upset too quickly, as the First Presidency have their inspiration from
the Lord, and sometimes it isn’t immediately explained, but it is RIGHT! (Grandma Pal,
2015)
or negative sentiment:
Basically it looks as though the Church, while indicating it's welcoming to those who
might attend, they really don't want anyone living in a Gay family relationship part of the
Church, even if you are a child. And they made it clear that if you are living in a Gay
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relationship, even if it is a legal marriage, especially if it is a legal marriage, there is no
place for you among the Latter Day Saints. Jesus wants it that way, according to
them. So fine that's their doctrine, it’s been written in stone, or at least in the Handbook.
(Mormon Faith Crisis Help, 2015)
Even though the Church included a response strategy of crisis basics in every statement, the
highest recognition of crisis basics before November 13 was only at 50% of all blog posts on
November 7–9 and that was two days after the Church’s initial response.
Furthermore, the Church also used justification twice as much in its November 13
statements compared to the single use of justification on November 6. Following the Church
response on November 6, bloggers recognized justification 25% of the time, but on November 13
that percentage jumped to 75% of all blog posts referring to the Church’s justifying arguments
for why the faith updated the policy.
Additionally, only 10% of blog posts recognized the Church’s use of protection response
strategy on November 6, but on November 13, 25% of blog entries recognized a protection
response strategy, and that doubled to 50% on November 14. A blog post written by a current
missionary for the Church shows all three of these response strategies in a single sentence: “The
Church made efforts today to clarify [crisis basics] this position as one intended to protect young
people [protection] from being put in the difficult position of conflict [justification] between
loyalty to their parents and loyalty to the gospel” (LJB, 2015).
Explaining the Success of November 13. In understanding what caused the change in
sentiment and framing on the second wave of Church’s responses it’s important to consider the
context of how the information was released. The handbook policy change was released under
dubious circumstances as John Dehlin, a former member of the church, made the information
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public instead of the Church. Because the Church did not release the information publicly, the
first wave of Church statements was more likely to be interpreted as an organization trying to
talk its way out of a corner after it’s been caught acting inappropriately. Furthermore, when the
Church remained was silent for the following seven days, it made the first wave of statements
seem final. However, when the Church resumed the conversation on November 13, there was a
recognizable relief from bloggers that the Church wasn’t trying to dodge or close the issue. The
Church attempted to take back some control of the discussion and it paid off.
The silent gap between the waves of Church statements may be due to the Church’s
internal cycle of approving official communication, as many high-ranking leaders are often
traveling to visit congregations around the world and weren’t readily available to sign off on the
second wave of statements. While the delay in regaining control was not ideal, resuming the
conversation did have a positive effect. An earlier second wave of response, may have negated
some of the crisis framing and negative sentiment that occurred during the gap between Church
statements.
Additionally, the crisis response strategy of ingratiation wasn’t present in the first two
statements from the Church. Even though stakeholders never mentioned the Church’s use of
ingratiation, it was present in both responses on November 13. Ingratiation is a helpful strategy
in repairing a relationship between an organization and stakeholders.
Finally, the medium in which the Church published Otterson’s statement, via blog, is also
notable. As practitioners and academics manage the impact of the blogosphere on public
relations practices, more crisis managers are starting to rely on blog-mediated crisis
communication (Jin & Liu, 2010) in order to exhibit authenticity and understanding of the crisis
discussion.
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The Key Stakeholder
Among the stakeholder groups, bloggers play a key role in responding to the crisis.
Bloggers represent the group most likely to share a variety of opinions and feelings about the
policy. While not exactly identical, bloggers are also the group in this study that most closely
represents the wide variety of thoughts and feelings of members of the Church who would be
affected by this policy. In triaging confused or emotionally injured stakeholders as the handbook
policy change was leaked, it is likely that the Church would give priority to helping current
members of the Church process the change over less connected groups like news media or angry
former members such as Dehlin. Because of this, it is important to note the significant shifts in
sentiment, crisis framing, and response strategy recognition from bloggers.
With its current resources like Mormon Newsroom, the Church does not have to rely on
news media to faciliate its message to that priority group. Instead it can publish its statements
online without risking information being shared out of context. This further serves as evidence
that the Church is not as concerned with changing the news media’s framing as it is with a direct
message to its members. The Church’s frustration with the media miscommunicating the original
statement is evidenced in part by the Church’s “other” response strategy:
The episode demonstrates clearly the dangers of drawing conclusions based on
incomplete news reports, tweets and Facebook posts without necessary context and
accurate information. . . .The vast majority of Church members understand that there has
been no doctrinal change with regard to LGBT issues. Church doctrine is consistent with
the life and teachings of Jesus Christ. There is a strong tendency today for many to talk of
Jesus Christ as if His teachings on love were somehow inconsistent with his teachings on
divine commandments. (Otterson, 2015)
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The “other” strategy, which I would define as standing ground reflects an attempt by the
Church to defend its changing of the handbook policy without apologizing to anyone who may
be hurt by the decision. Every time the Church uses this strategy, it is metaphorically digging in
its heels to defy anyone who would challenge the Church on the policy. Additionally by
referencing the teachings of Jesus Christ, the “other” strategy puts the responsibility on
stakeholders to understand the life and teachings of the Church’s central figure in order to find
peace about the crisis (e.g., Those who truly understand the gospel of Jesus Christ shouldn’t be
upset by this policy because it is consistent with those teachings, as articulated through Church
leadership).
Crisis management and its relevant strategies such as, SCCT and conflict resolution
tactics, focus on building trust and repairing relationships, but as communications scholar Kevin
Stoker (2014) asserts, not every relationship is repairable or even worth maintaining:
Practitioners want two-way symmetrical communication, but the statement itself is oneway, demanding reciprocity. No guarantee exists that the public will reciprocate unless
coerced. Dialogue that leads to consensus and agreement may be ethical, but also could
be tyrannical (p.353).
Stoker’s identification of this paradox in public relations is particular fitting when considering
the Church’s targeted audience. The Church isn’t going to waste time trying to sway the opinion
of Dehlin or news media who are biased against the Church. The strategic messages from the
Church focused on reaching bloggers and other stakeholders who favor the Church but were
distressed by the recent handbook change.
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Strengths and Weaknesses of SCCT
According to SCCT, informing and adjusting information in a crisis response strategy,
using crisis basics or protection, can be all that is needed when crises have minimal attribution of
crisis responsibility or no history of similar cases (Coombs, 2007, p. 173). Similarly, a
justification response strategy is only recommended in crises with little to no attribution of crisis
responsibility and no history of similar crises. With this theoretical foundation, it is unexpected
that the Church response strategies of crisis basics and justification would have had such a
substantial effect on John Dehlin’s and bloggers’ framing and sentiment on November 13
because the majority of both groups had been framing the policy change as organizational
misdeed with injuries just prior to the second wave of Church statements. According to SCCT,
the crisis type of organizational misdeed with injuries has a strong attribution of crisis
responsibility and would thus require many additional response strategies including apology
and/or compensation, which the Church never used. It is this type of unexpected result that
exposes a weakness in Coombs’ SCCT, answering RQ4: “Based upon this crisis, what are the
strengths and weaknesses of Coombs’ SCCT?”
In SCCT guidelines for crafting a response strategy, Coombs recommends that
organizations “maintain consistency in crisis response strategies. Mixing deny crisis response
strategies with either the diminish or rebuild strategies will erode the effectiveness of the overall
response” (Coombs, 2007, p. 173). Although the Church did use diminishing (excuse and
justification) and rebuilding (reminder and ingratiation) strategies, it never used deny strategies.
For as often as the handbook policy change was framed as an organizational misdeed
with injuries, SCCT would have recommended that the Church rebuild its reputation through
apology or compensation and reminding stakeholders of all the good deeds that are unrelated to
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the crisis issue that the Church has accomplished in the past. Although the Church did use
reminding, the reminders called attention to the Church’s past history of opposing same-sex
marriage, which was at the very crux of the crisis. Instead of using the recommended response
strategies based on the crisis framing, the Church’s statements used lower-level response
strategies like justification to distance itself from from the idea that a crisis existed. These
additional strategies of reminders, ingratiation, and justificaiton were similar to but not exactly
the prescribed method for SCCT. Instead of using justification to explain a misunderstanding or
incompetency within Church leadership that resulted in the policy change, the Church instead
justified why the policy change was very intentional and fitted with past doctrine. Table 9
illustrates Coombs’ recommended strategic responses strategies for the crisis types of challenge
and organizational misdeed with injury compared to the respons strategies used by the Church.
Many of SCCT’s elements are effective. The foundational strategy of providing
information and crisis basics is key in any circumstance for any organization. And, as the Church
demonstrated, the recommended crisis response strategies can be tweaked to fit the situation
depending on whether an organization chooses to recognize its fault in a crisis or ignore frames
of crises altogether. SCCT could potentially be a platform for building a more thorough theory
to assist organizations caught in scenarios where key values are under attack and the organization
wishes to stand by those values. Currently, there is a lack of literature and case studies in this
area.
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Table 9
Recommended and Employed Crisis Response Strategies
Challenge

Organizational Misdeed with Injuries

Church’s Response

Protection

Protection

Protection*

Crisis Basics

Crisis Basics

Crisis Basics

Corrective Action

Corrective Action

Express Concern

Express Concern

Express Concern

Excuse

Excuse

Excuse

Justification

Justification

Justification*

Compensation
Apology
Reminder

Reminder*

Ingratiation

Ingratiation

Other: Standing Ground
Note. Crisis response strategies are adapted from “Protecting Organization Reputations During a
Crisis: The Development and Application of Situational Crisis Communication Theory.,” by W.
T. Coombs, 2007, Corporate Reputation Review, 10(3), p. 170. A crisis frame of “challenge”
asserts an organization acted unintentionally act by a company resulting from incompetence. A
crisis frame of “organizational misdeed with injuries” asserts the organization acted intentionally
and caused emotional and/or physical harm. *Indicates a variation of the recommended crisis
response strategy
Crisis management vs. contingency theory and conflict resolution. Although there is a
lack of crisis management literature that explores the scenario of an organization wishing to
defend and supports its values, studies of contingency theory and conflict resolution may also fit
within the scope of the handbook policy change, and provide strategies for an organization to
stand behind its values and actions. It is likely the Church did not perceive the handbook change
as a crisis, but rather a conflict where two opposing sides have different opinions on how an
issue should be approached: The Church decided it was going to make same-sex marriage
grounds for apostasy, while stakeholders outside of the Church are pushing the Church to
celebrate and welcome same-sex marriage. If the Church approached the handbook change as
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something that caused a conflict, the Church could still respond to the conflict while still
maintaining authenticity and holding true to its doctrine.
Contingency theory explains the degree to which an organization uses an advocacy or
accommodative response to conflicts with stakeholders (Cancel, Cameron, Sallot, & Motrook
1997; Cameron, Pang, & Jin 2008). Stance is the key variable in contingency theory. A stance is
how an organization responds to conflicts with other parties and is placed on a continuum
anchored by advocacy and accommodation. Advocacy is when an organization argues for its
own interests, while accommodating is when the organizations makes concessions to the other
parties (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). In the context of contingency theory, the Church’s
responses were very much on the advocacy end of the spectrum as the Church did its best to
explain why it updated the handbook. The Church positioned itself on that end of the
contingency continuum because it was trying to stay true to its values, goals, and divine mission.
A number of studies have begun to apply contingency theory to crisis communication,
with research noting similarities between contingency theory stances and the crisis response
strategies of SCCT (Pang et al., 2004). Contingency theory offers a useful integrative framework
but SCCT, as a middle range theory, can be useful to explain audience effects crisis
communication research as in this thesis. SCCT can be used to operationalize the critical
variables identified by contingency theory.
While contingency theory covers the position of the organization’s response, the conflict
resolution field (within the sphere of public relations) employs seven negotiation tactics in
managing a conflict: contending, collaborating, compromising, avoiding, accommodating,
unconditionally constructive, and win/win or no deal (Plowman, 1998). Unconditionally
constructive is used in the positive sense of Fisher and Brown (1988); that is, the decision of the
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organization “will be both good for the relationship between the two parties and good for the
organization, whether or not you follow the same guidelines” (p.37). This tactic was employed
by the Church in its statements when it argued that barring children of same-sex parents from
baptism was in the best interest of everyone. Win/win or no deal is an alternative negotiation
tactic that goes beyond being unconditionally constructive. The only options in this situation are
for both parties either to collaborate in mutually beneficial circumstances or to “agree to
disagree.” In the Church blog by Otterson, the repeated idea that the policy change was “a matter
of being clear; it’s a matter of understanding right and wrong; it’s a matter of a firm policy that
doesn’t allow for question or doubt” (Otterson, 2015) implies the Church never intends to
negotiate or collaborate on this stance. If the Church were to use any form of collaboration,
compromise, or accommodation it would undermine the foundation of the Church’s claim to be
led by God and not worldly opinions. These tactics are evidence that the Church was managing a
conflict, not a crisis.
There aren’t yet distinct markers for where a conflict becomes a crisis, but I propose that
in order for an event to be labeled as a crisis, both the organization and the stakeholders must see
a need for change. In this thesis, although the opposing stakeholders saw a need for corrective
action and change, the Church chose to see the handbook change as a conflict that warranted a
response to distressed stakeholders, but not a change to policy.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Based on the assumption that SCCT does not lend itself well to crises where the
organization does not wish to apologize for or acknowledge a crisis, this study found some
susbtantial shifts in stakeholder attitudes following certain strategic statements from the Church
even though the Church did not strictly adhere to SCCT’s guidelines.
The examination of this crisis offered insight into SCCT’s lack of clarity and direction
concerning its crisis types, strategies, and guidelines. According to SCCT’s guidelines, because
the majority of the time the stakeholder groups framed the handbook change as a crisis of
organizational misdeed with injuries, the Church should have responsded with third-tier
strategies that bolstered its reputation and apologized to or compensated those harmed by the
policy. Instead, the Church’s responses align with SCCT more as a suggestion than a recipe. The
Church used variations of bolstering, such as reminding stakeholders of its past policies
regarding same-sex marriage instead of reminding stakeholders of past good works unrelated to
the crisis.
Although the Church used the same strategies throughout the entire crisis, the Church’s
relatively larger use of crisis basics, justification, and protection in its second wave of statements
on November 13 shifted the crisis framing and sentiment of bloggers and John Dehlin from
negative sentiment with frames of high-level crisis responsibility to neutral and positive
sentiment with a majority of blog entries and social media posts having no crisis frame at all.
SCCT is still a relatively new theory and will have to change and evolve as new crisis
communication pathways are developed. While not perfect, it does offer a blueprint to help
organizations navigate in times of crisis.
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Future Research
This study only accounted for the presence of a crisis response strategy in a Church
statement, and not the number of times the response strategy was used in the statement. Further
research on the reoccurance of response strategies within different statements, both from the
handbook policy change and other similar Church crises, may provide additional insight on
which strategies the Church uses most often.
Qualitative analysis that includes interviews with the Church public affairs department
would further add to the body of knowledge about how organizations respond to such a crisis
because crisis managers could potentially explain their thought process as the crisis unfolded.
A comparison of blog sentiment and framing to social media sentiment and framing
would also be relevant to demonstrate how blogging content may differ from social media
content during this crisis.
Outside of this particular crisis, it would be helpful to study similar cases and strategies
of organizations who try to defend foundational values and to compare sentiment changes among
the different scenarios.
Limitations
Because of the relatively limited number of articles, blog posts, and social media posts
surrounding the handbook policy change, it is difficult to show statistical significance supporting
any response strategy from the Church having an effect on sentiment or change in frame.
Another limitation of this study is the grouping of bloggers as a whole. Twenty-three of
the blogs came from 14 repeat bloggers, who provided more than one post during the crisis
timeline. All of the repeat bloggers whose first post contained positive sentiment, maintained that
positive sentiment towards the Church throughout the rest of their blog entries. The waning
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positive sentiment from November 5 to November 11 is not because bloggers who started out
positive became disenchanted. Instead the downward trend may be due to the positivists being
satisfied with Church responses and no longer feeling a need to continue to talk about the
change. Additionally, any repeat bloggers who started out neutral or negative in sentiment did
not improve their sentiment score. Those scores either remained consistent or increased in
negativity. This means that when positive sentiment spiked following the Church statements on
November 13, it was due to bloggers who already supported the Church writing additional
supportive blog posts for the handbook policy change. It also means that the decrease in negative
sentiment and organizational misdeed with injury framing was a result of policy opposers not
having an immediate response to the new statements.
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Appendix: Codebook and Codesheet

Church Handbook Policy Change Codebook
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CODING SHEET 1
1.
Please write the name of the news outlet, blog title, social media account, or description
of the Church response under analysis.
2.
Please mark (1) if the media is a news article. Mark (2) if the media is a blog. Mark (3) if
the media is a Facebook post by John Dehlin. Mark (4) if this is an official Church response.
3.
Indicate the publishing date and time based on the article date or timestamp provided by
the blogging site or Facebook.
Crisis Types
4.
Challenges: Code for challenges when the piece of media makes mention of or alludes to
the Church being unaware or unintentionally acting in an inappropriate manner. This may
include acting incompetently and changing the handbook policies without understanding the
consequences.
5.
Organizational misdeed with no injuries: Code for organizational misdeed with no
injuries when the media mentions or alludes the Church knowingly caused the crisis, but doesn’t
mention any potential or occurring physical and/or emotional harm.
6.
Organizational misdeed management misconduct: Code for organization misdeed
management misconduct when the media mentions or alludes the Church knowingly violated
laws or regulations. The laws and regulations could be internal laws and regulations of the
Church or civil laws and regulations.
7.
Organizational misdeed with injuries: Code of organizational misdeed with injuries when
the media mentions or alludes the Church knowingly put stakeholders at risk, and mentions
possible or occurring physical and/or emotional harm.
Sentiment
8.

Rate the tone of the media in terms of sentiment from a holistic standpoint:
1 = Negative feelings toward the Church
2 = Neutral or balanced feelings toward the Church, no clear stance favoring either side
3 = Positive feelings toward the Church

Crisis Response Strategies
9.
Protection: Code for protection if the Church or crisis manager for the Church provides
information for how stakeholders can protect from physical and/or emotional harm.
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10.
Crisis Basics: Code for crisis basics if the Church or crisis manager for the Church
provides information about the crisis including answers to who, what, when, where, why, and
how questions.
11.
Corrective Action: Code for correction action when the Church or crisis manager for the
Church describes what is being done to protect stakeholders from similar crises in the future.
12.
Express Concern for Victims: Code for expression of concern when the Church or crisis
manager for the Church acknowledges some stakeholders may be physically or emotionally
harmed by the change. This is not an admission of guilt, only sympathy.
13.
Attack the Accuser: Code for attack the accuser when the Church or crisis manager for
the Church confronts a person or group who has criticized the Church.
14.
Denial: Code for denial when the Church or crisis manager for the Church asserts there is
no crisis.
15.
Scapegoat: Code for scapegoat when the Church or crisis manager for the Church blames
some individual or group outside of the Church for the crisis.
16.
Excuse: Code for excuse when the Church or crisis manager for the Church minimizes
Church responsibility responsibility by denying intent to do harm or claiming inability to control
the events that triggered the crisis
17.
Justification: Code for justification when the Church or crisis manager for the Church
minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis.
18.
Compensation: Code for compensation when the Church or crisis manager for the Church
offers money or other gifts to victims.
19.
Apology: Code for apology when the Church or crisis manager for the Church indicates
the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks for forgiveness.
20.
Reminder: Code for reminder when the Church or crisis manager for the Church tells
stakeholders about the past good works and history of the Church.
21.
Ingratiation: Code for ingratiation when the Church or crisis manager for the Church
praises stakeholders for past good works of the Church.
22.
Victimage: Code for victimage when the Church or crisis manager for the Church
reminds stakeholders that the Church is also a victim of the crisis.
23.
Other: If a Church response varied from the Crisis Response Strategies listed above or
didn’t use any of the crisis response strategies, explain what the Church did include in its
response and include any supporting statements or paragraphs from the response.
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Master’s Thesis: Church Handbook Policy Change
Coding Sheet
1 Description of media (News outlet, blog title, social media, Church response description):
2

Type of Media: (Circle one)
(1) News Article (2) Blog Post (3) John Dehlin (4) Church Response

3

Publication Date and Time:_____________________________________________

Crisis Types (most likely mutually exclusive – only one of these)
Accidental Cluster
4

Challenges

(0) Absent (1) Present

(The Church is unaware or unintentionally acting in an inappropriate manner)

Preventable Cluster
5
6
7

Organizational misdeed with no injuries

(0) Absent (1) Present

Organizational misdeed management misconduct

(0) Absent (1) Present

Organizational misdeed with injuries

(0) Absent (1) Present

(The Church knowingly caused this crisis, but no mention of physical/emotional harm)

(The Church is violating laws or regulations)

(The Church put stakeholders at risk and there is mention of physical/emotional)

Sentiment
8

In relation to the Church, what is the tone of the media?
Negative

1

2

3

Positive

Crisis Response Strategies (not mutually exclusive)
9

Protection

(0) Absent (1) Present

10

Crisis Basics

(0) Absent (1) Present

(Provide information for what stakeholders can do to protect from physical/emotional harm)

(Provide information about the crisis: who, what when, where, why, and how)
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11

Corrective action

(0) Absent (1) Present

12

Express concern for victims

(0) Absent (1) Present

13

Attack the accuser

(0) Absent (1) Present

14

Denial

(0) Absent (1) Present

15

Scapegoat

(0) Absent (1) Present

(What is being done to protect stakeholders from future crises)

(Not admission of guilt, but expected by stakeholders)

(Crisis managers confronts the person or group claiming something is wrong with the Church)

(Crisis manager asserts there is no crisis)

(Crisis manager blames some person or group outside of the Church for the crisis)

16 Excuse

(0) Absent (1) Present

17 Justification

(0) Absent (1) Present

18 Compensation

(0) Absent (1) Present

19 Apology

(0) Absent (1) Present

20 Reminder

(0) Absent (1) Present

21 Ingratiation

(0) Absent (1) Present

22 Victimage

(0) Absent (1) Present

23

(0) Absent (1) Present

(Crisis manager minimizes Church responsibility by denying intent to do harm or claiming inability to
control the events that triggered the crisis)

(Crisis manager minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis)

(Crisis managers offer money or other gifts to victims)

(Crisis manager indicates the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks for forgiveness)

(Tell stakeholders about the past good works of the Church)

(Crisis manager praises stakeholders or reminds them of past good works of the Church)

(Crisis managers remind stakeholders that the Church is a victim of the crisis too)

Other

(The Church response differs from strategies above)
Explain below:

Comments:

